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Abstract—A blind decryption scheme enables a user to query
decryptions from a decryption server without revealing informa-
tion about the plaintext message. Such schemes are useful, for
example, for the implementation of privacy preserving encrypted
file storages and payment systems. In terms of functionality, blind
decryption is close to oblivious transfer. For noiseless channels,
information-theoretically secure oblivious transfer is impossible.
However, in this paper we show that this is not the case for
blind decryption. We formulate a definition of perfect secrecy
of symmetric blind decryption for the following setting: at most
one of the scheme participants is a malicious observer. We also
devise a symmetric blind decryption scheme based on modular
arithmetic on a ring Zp2 , where p is a prime, and show that it
satisfies our notion of perfect secrecy.
Index Terms—Communication system security, Cryptography,
Encryption, Information security
I. INTRODUCTION
Over the past 15 years, data has moved from local storage
to centralized data warehouses in the cloud. The accessibility
of large amounts of personal data through a public network
has given rise to many security and privacy issues [1]. For-
tunately, such issues have generally been taken seriously. For
example, ethical and legal requirements have been imposed
on guaranteeing the confidentiality of medical records [2], [3].
However, the implementation of privacy technologies is non-
trivial, especially if the data storage has been outsourced to
a cloud operator. Sensitive information can often be inferred
from simple access patterns either by outsiders or by the
operator of the storage. For example, being able to observe
a medical doctor to access the medical record of a patient
can leak sensitive information. Therefore, such access patterns
should be kept hidden both from outsiders and from the party
that is administering the records.
Oblivious databases [4] and privacy-preserving encrypted
filesystems [5] are examples of technologies that can be used
to hide the access information from the administrator. For
such systems, the decryption of data is typically handled
by a central decryption server. Such systems can be con-
veniently implemented using blind decryption schemes [6].
Blind decryption is a versatile primitive. It can be used as a
building block for many privacy critical applications, such as
privacy-preserving payment systems [7], key escrow systems,
oblivious transfer protocols [8], privacy-preserving systems for
digital rights management [9], [10] and private information
retrieval [11].
A blind decryption scheme consists of an encryption scheme
together with a blind decryption protocol intended to decrypt
messages in a privacy-preserving fashion. The meaning of
”blind decryption” can be easily described based on the
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Figure 1. Blind decryption. Alice has obtained L ciphertexts from an
encryptor and is entitled to choose exactly one of those for decryption. Alice
interacts with a decryptor that shares a key k with the encryptor to transform
the ciphertext message ci into a plaintext message mi. Neither the encryptor
nor the decryptor learn the plaintext message chosen by Alice.
following scenario depicted in Figure 1. Suppose that Alice
has obtained several encrypted messages from an encryptor.
Alice is entitled to choose and decrypt exactly one of those
messages. Suppose that the decryption key k is stored on a
decryption server and Alice wishes to have the server decrypt
the message for her in such a way that neither the encryptor
nor the decryptor learn the message chosen by Alice.
There are suggestions for practical blind decryption based
on public key cryptography [5], [6], [12]–[14]. It is also
possible to implement the blind decryption functionality with
other protocols such as secure multi party computation [15].
However, the resulting schemes would be computationally
demanding. For many applications symmetric primitives are
sufficient and computationally more efficient. In addition,
they can provide secrecy that is not based on computational
assumptions. Oblivious transfer schemes [16], [17] deliver
the same functionality directly between the sender and the
receiver without the decryption server. However, for noiseless
channels, information-theoretically secure oblivious transfer is
impossible [18]. In addition, there does not seem to exist blind
decryption schemes such that the privacy of the user is based
on information-theoretic security. Our work aims to fill this
shortage. In this paper, we give a meaningful definition of
perfect secrecy for the blind decryption scenario. In particular,
we formulate perfect secrecy of symmetric blind decryption in
a setting where at most one of the participants is maliciously
observing but adhering to the protocol. We also propose a
symmetric key blind decryption scheme SymmetricBlind that
satisfies our definition. The scheme is based on modular
arithmetic on a ring Zp2 , where p is a prime.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we de-
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2scribe work that is related to ours. Section III discusses the
fundamental definitions and the preliminaries for the rest of
the paper. In Section IV, we formulate three perfect secrecy
properties that the blind decryption scheme needs to satisfy.
In Section V, we give a description of a symmetric blind de-
cryption scheme SymmetricBlind. In Section VI, we show that
the devised scheme satisfies our definition of perfect secrecy.
Finally, Section VII considers future work and Section VIII
provides the conclusion.
II. RELATED WORK
Chaum was the first to consider blindness in the context of
digital signatures and privacy preserving payment systems [7].
He described the first public key blind signature scheme [19]
by utilizing the properties of RSA encryption [20]. The scheme
can be also used for encryption and can be therefore consid-
ered as the first blind decryption scheme. In the early articles,
blind decryption is referred to as ”blind decoding”. Dis-
crete logarithm based blind signature schemes were suggested
in [21]–[24]. Sakurai and Yamane were the first to consider
public key blind decryption based on the discrete logarithm
problem [6]. Their method was based on the ElGamal cryp-
tosystem [25] and related to the blind signature of Camenisch,
Piveteau and Stadler [24]. The method was later applied for the
implementation of a key escrow system [12]. Mambo, Sakurai
and Okamoto were the first to consider blind decryption
that is secure against chosen plaintext attacks by signing
the ciphertext messages [26]. The resulting scheme is not
capable of public key encryption since a secret signing key is
required. Green described the first public key blind decryption
scheme [5] that is secure against adaptive chosen ciphertext
attacks (IND-CCA2) using bilinear groups. The security of
these constructions has been considered computationally either
in the random oracle model [11] or using computational
indistinguishability and infeasibility assumptions [5].
Oblivious transfer protocols are symmetric primitives that
offer functionality similar to blind decryption. For oblivious
transfer, there are two participants: a sender and a receiver.
For the original definition of oblivious transfer, the sender
transmits a message which the receiver gets with probabil-
ity 1/2. The sender remains oblivious whether the receiver
actually got the message. This form of oblivious transfer was
introduced by Rabin [16]. The concept was later extended by
Even, Goldreich and Lempel [17]. For (2
1
)-oblivious transfer,
the receiver can choose one from two messages without the
sender knowing which of the messages were chosen. A related
concept that can be considered as a further generalization is
all-or-nothing disclosure of secrets [27] for which Alice is
willing to disclose at most one secret from a set to Bob without
Bob learning information about the rest of the secrets. Alice
must not learn which secret Bob chose.
Adaptive queries were considered by Naor and Pinkas [28].
They also considered active adversaries and provided security
definitions relating to the simulatability of the receivers. Ca-
menisch, Neven and Shelat extended the work of Naor and
Pinkas by defining simulatable oblivious transfer [29] and
providing practical constructions for such a scheme. There are
other suggestions for oblivious transfer based on problems in
bilinear groups [30], groups of composite order [31] and the
Diffie-Hellman problem [32]–[37]. These schemes are based
on computational assumptions. It is impossible to achieve
information-theoretic security for both of the parties using
noiseless channels [18]. However, it is possible using noisy
channels such as discrete memoryless channels [38] or a
trusted initializer [39].
General multiparty computation protocols can be also ap-
plied to implement blind decryption capabilities. Secure mul-
tiparty computation was originally introduced by Yao [40] for
two party case. The general case for n ≥ 2 is due to Goldreich,
Micali and Wigderson [41]. However, secure multiparty com-
putation protocols are computationally intensive in comparison
to pure blind decryption and oblivious transfer.
III. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notation
For the set of integers modulo n, we denote Zn ={[0], [1], . . . , [n − 1]} and equate a congruence class with
its least non-negative representative. That is, we consider
Zn = {0,1, . . . , n − 1}. By the notation xmod n we mean
the unique i ∈ {0,1, . . . , n − 1} such that i ≡ x (mod n).
We denote the uniform distribution on a set X by U(X).
If a random variable Z is uniformly distributed on a set X ,
we denote it by Z ∼ U(X). When an element x is sampled
from U(X), we denote it by x← U(X).
B. Symmetric encryption
A symmetric encryption scheme SE = (Gen,Enc,Dec) with
keyspace K, plaintext space M and ciphertext space C consists
of three algorithms:
1) The key generation algortihm Gen(s): On input a security
parameter s, Gen outputs a key k ∈ K.
2) The encryption algorithm Enc(k,m): On input a key k ∈K and a message m ∈M, Enc outputs a ciphertext c ∈ C.
3) The decryption algorithm Dec(k,m): On input a key k ∈K and a ciphertext c ∈ C, Dec outputs a message m ∈M
such that m = Dec(k,Enc(k,m)).
C. Blind decryption
Blind decryption has been considered in the literature for
the asymmetric case. However, in this paper we are interested
in the symmetric case which is easily adapted from the
asymmetric one [5]. A symmetric blind decryption scheme
BlindDecryption consists of a symmetric encryption scheme
SE = (Gen,Enc,Dec) and a two-party protocol BlindDec. The
protocol BlindDec is conducted between an honest user Alice
and the decryption server which we shall call the Decryptor.
The protocol enables Alice, that is in possession of a ciphertext
c, to finish the protocol with the correct decryption of c. As
a result of running BlindDec, Alice on input a ciphertext
c = Enc(k,m) ∈ C outputs either the message m ∈ M or
an error message ⊥. The Decryptor, on input the key k ∈ K,
outputs nothing or an error message ⊥.
3To be secure, the exchanged messages must not leak infor-
mation to malicious users (the leak-freeness property [8]). The
property can be formalized based on computational indistin-
guishability. For every adversary, there has to be a simulator
so that the following two games are well defined. For the first
game, a probabilistic polynomial time (PPT) adversary A can
choose any number L of ciphertexts ci for i ∈ {1,2, . . . , L}.
It is then given the correct decryptions by executing BlindDec
with the Decryptor. Finally, A outputs the plaintext message,
ciphertext pairs (mi, ci) for i ∈ {1,2, . . . , L}. For the second
game, a simulator S chooses any number L of ciphertexts
ci for i ∈ {1,2, . . . , L}. In this game, the plaintext messages
are obtained by querying a trusted party. BlindDecryption is
leak-free if for every PPT adversary A there is a simulator
S such that for every PPT distinguisher D the probability of
distinguishing between these two games is negligible [5].
Another important property for secure blind decryption
is the blindness property. It formalizes the idea that the
Decryptor must not learn anything about the actual plaintext
message. This can be formalized by giving a PPT algorithm
D the possibility to choose two ciphertexts c1, c2 and giving
it oracle access to two instances of BlindDec based on these
choices. If the probability of distinguishing these two instances
is negligible for every PPT algorithm D, then BlindDecryption
satisfies ciphertext blindness. For a formal and rigorous defi-
nition, see for example [5].
D. Perfect secrecy
The notion of perfect secrecy is due to Shannon [42]. Let
SE = (Gen,Enc,Dec) be an encryption scheme with keyspaceK, plaintext space M and ciphertext space C. Let K denote a
random variable on the keyspace induced by Gen. SE satisfies
perfect secrecy if for every random variable M on the plaintext
space, every plaintext m ∈M and every ciphertext c ∈ C,
Pr [M =m∣c = Enc(K,M)] = Pr [M =m] .
Equivalently, SE satisfies perfect secrecy if and only if for ev-
ery random variable M on the plaintext space, every plaintext
messages m1,m2 ∈M and every ciphertext c ∈ C,
Pr [c = Enc(K,M)∣M =m1]= Pr [c = Enc(K,M)∣M =m2] .
IV. PERFECT SECRECY FOR SYMMETRIC BLIND
DECRYPTION
Instead of computational indistinguishability, we shall now
consider secrecy of symmetric blind decryption based on the
information observed by the parties. In the following, let SE =(Gen,Enc,Dec) together with BlindDec be a symmetric blind
decryption scheme with keyspace K, plaintext space M and
ciphertext space C.
A. The scenario
For the sake of clarity, we do not consider active adversaries.
We assume that the parties adhere to the blind decryption
protocol and only observe the flow of messages (and possibly
Alice Encryptor
m1,m2, . . . ,mL∀j cj = Enc(k,mj)
c1, c2, . . . , cL ←Ð c1, c2, . . . , cL
Pick i ∈ {1,2, . . . , L}
Decryptor
Derive c′i from ci
c′i Ð→ c′i
m′i = Dec(k, c′i)
m′i ←Ð m′i
Derive mi from m′i
Figure 2. The general blind decryption scenario. Alice chooses a ciphertext
ci and derives a related ciphertext c′i that she transmits to the decryptor. The
decryptor responds with the corresponding plaintext message m′i from which
Alice can recover mi.
deduce information from those messages). Active adversaries
could, for example, induce errors to the protocol messages.
Such adversarial scenarios are left for future work. In addition,
we do not consider the case that the Decryptor is colluding
with either Alice or the Encryptor against the other. Such
a case is equivalent to the oblivious transfer scenario and
information-theoretic security is impossible for noiseless chan-
nels [18]. However, we note that such collusion scenarios are
important for certain applications and need to be investigated
in the future. We do consider the case that the adversary
is impersonating one of the parties which is a paramount
requirement for many applications.
For clarity, we also restrict to the case that Alice decrypts
a single message m ∈ M. Similar to the one-time pad, we
assume that a new key is derived after every decryption.
However, in our case there could be several ciphertexts
c1, c2, . . . , cL encrypted under the same key. Nevertheless,
once Alice has decrypted one of the messages we consider that
particular key used and a new key and a new set of ciphertexts
is generated.
The scenario is the following. The Encryptor chooses a set
of L plaintext messages mi for i ∈ {1,2, . . . , L}. He encrypts
those messages under a key k to obtain ciphertext messages
cj = Enc(k,mj) for j ∈ {1,2, . . . , L} that he transmits to
Alice. Alice chooses one of those messages ci. To hide the
actual ciphertext ci, we assume that there is a ciphertext
transformation space C′ ⊆ C so that Alice can derive a related
ciphertext message c′i ∈ C′ that she transmits to the Decryptor.
The Decryptor responds with its decryption m′i ∈ M which
Alice transforms to the correct plaintext message mi. The
general scenario has been depicted in Figure 2. The used
variables have been collected into Table I for easier reference.
B. Security requirements
As described in Section III-C, the scheme has to satisfy the
following property.
4Table I
VARIABLES
Symbol DescriptionK key spaceM plaintext spaceC ciphertext spaceC′ ciphertext transformation space
k blind encryption / decryption key
L the number of messages encrypted under
a single blind decryption key
m1,m2, . . . ,mL plaintext messages chosen by the Encryptor
c1, c2, . . . , cL ciphertext messages obtained by encrypting
with the blind encryption key
c or ci ciphertext message chosen by Alice
c′ or c′i transformed ciphertext message chosen by Alice
m′ or m′i decryption of c′ under the blind decryption key
m or mi the plaintext message Alice obtains at the end
of the scheme
ff
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
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Figure 3. Malicious Encryptor. The adversary attempts to learn which
message was chosen by Alice.
1) Leak-freeness. Malicious observers must not learn infor-
mation about the plaintext messages by observing the
exchanges.
The easiest way to provide leak-freeness against malicious
observers that are not participants of the scheme is to protect
each exchange with an encryption scheme that satisfies perfect
secrecy. However, leakage need to be also addressed consid-
ering maliciousness of the protocol participants. Considering
each individual party, we can divide leak-freeness as follows.
1.1) Leak-freeness against the Encryptor. Malicious encryptor
must not learn information about the plaintext message
obtained by Alice at the end of the protocol by observing
the blind decryption messages. The situation is depicted
in Figure 3.
1.2) Leak-freeness against Alice. This property ensures that,
after obtaining mi, Alice does not learn information about
the remaining L−1 plaintexts mj for j ≠ i. The situation
is depicted in Figure 4.
In contrast to computational security, we cannot define leak-
freeness as a distinguishing problem. Instead, we shall con-
sider the probability distributions regarding the exchanged
elements.
We also want to prevent Decryptor from deducing informa-
tion about the plaintext message mi.

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
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mj? j ≠ i c1,c2,...,cL←Ð
ff



Encryptor
∀j mj ↦ cj
c′i×××Ö uparrow×××m′iff



c′i ↦m′i
Decryptor
Figure 4. Malicious Alice. The adversary attempts to decrypt additional
messages.ff
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Figure 5. Malicious Decryptor. The adversary attempts to learn the plaintext
message that Alice obtains.
2) Blindness against the Decryptor. This property ensures
that a malicious decryption server does not learn the
message Alice wants to decrypt. The situation is depicted
in Figure 5.
In the computational security setting, there can be multiple
applications of the blind decryption protocol for a fixed key. In
our case, we want a fresh key for every decryption to achieve
perfect secrecy. Therefore, we formulate leak-freeness and
blindness for a single decryption. However, as was described
before, we want to be able to encrypt multiple messages with
the same key. For example, in privacy-preserving payment
systems blind decryption is used to enable Alice to choose
one – but only one – item from a selection of items. This
results in a scenario in which there are L plaintext, ciphertext
pairs (mj , cj) for j ∈ {1,2, . . . , L} but there is only a single
application of BlindDec.
In the following section, we formulate these conditions
based on information. Note that these conditions also provide
secrecy against malicious observers that are not participants of
the scheme since the information possessed by such observers
is a proper subset of that of any of the participants. The
following notation is used. Let K denote the random variable
of blind decryption keys on the key space K induced by Gen.
Let Mj for j ∈ {1,2, . . . , L} denote the random variables
corresponding to the choice of mi for j ∈ {1,2, . . . , L} by the
5Table II
RANDOM VARIABLES
Random variable Description
K random variable on K induced by Gen
M1,M2, . . . ,ML random variables corresponding to the choice
of m1,m2, . . . ,mL by the encryptor
C′ random variable on C′ induced by Alice
using BlindDec
M ′ random variable on M induced by decryption
of C′ by the decryptor
M random variable corresponding to the plaintext
message m Alice obtains at the end of the scheme
Encryptor and let M denote the random variable correspond-
ing to the plaintext m Alice obtains at the end of the scheme.
Following the standard practice [43], we assume that K is
independent with M and Mj for every j ∈ {1,2, . . . , L}. Let
C ′ denote the random variable on the ciphertext transformation
space C′ for the ciphertext message c′ that Alice discloses
to the Decryptor. Finally, let M ′ denote the random variable
corresponding to the message m′ that the Decryptor responds
with. These variables have been collected into Table II.
C. Perfect leak-freeness against the encryptor
We shall first formulate leak-freeness against the Encryptor.
The blind decryption protocol messages c′ and m′ should not
disclose any information about mi to the Encryptor. Equiva-
lently, the messages should not leak information about the i
that was chosen by Alice even if the Encryptor knows the key
k and the right plaintext messages mj for j ∈ {1,2, . . . , L}.
Definition 4.1 (Perfect leak-freeness against encryptor):
A symmetric blind decryption scheme is perfectly leak-free
against the encryptor for a single decryption of a maximum
of L messages if for every random variable M,Mj for j ∈{1,2, . . . , L} on the plaintext space and every m,m′,mj ∈M
for j ∈ {1,2, . . . , L} and every c′ ∈ C′,
Pr [M =m ∣C ′ = c′ ∩M ′ =m′ L⋂
j=1Mj =mj ]
= Pr [M =m ∣ L⋂
j=1Mj =mj ] .
Our definition states that a malicious Encryptor can equally
easily guess the plaintext message Alice wanted to be de-
crypted with or without information provided by the blind
decryption protocol messages c′ and m′. Note that, in the
normal scenario, M =Mi for some i ∈ {1,2, . . . , L}. However,
we do not want to restrict the definition to such a case.
For example, there could be homomorphic blind decryption
schemes for which certain operations could be permitted
on the ciphertexts. Note also that the Encryptor inherently
possesses more information about m than an outsider since
m is dependent on m1,m2, . . . ,mL.
D. Perfect leak-freeness against Alice
In order to be practical, the scheme needs to ensure that
Alice is not able to decrypt messages. Therefore, we need to
ensure that Alice obtains neither the decryption key nor any
information about the decryptions of c1, c2, . . . , cL without
interacting with the Decryptor. In addition, after a single
application of BlindDec, Alice must not have any information
about the remaining L−1 messages. To make the requirement
precise, we require that the observation of a single plaintext,
ciphertext pair (m1, c1) does not leak any information about
the decryption of another ciphertext c2. The property is, in
fact, a property of the encryption scheme.
Definition 4.2 (Perfect leak-freeness against Alice): A sym-
metric encryption scheme SE satisfies perfect leak-freeness
against Alice for a single decryption if for every random
variable M1,M2 on the plaintext space, every m1,m2,m ∈M
and every c1, c2 ∈ C such that c1 ≠ c2,
Pr [c1 = Enc(K,M1) ∩ c2 = Enc(K,M2)∣M1 =m1 ∩M2 =m2 ]= Pr [c1 = Enc(K,M1) ∩ c2 = Enc(K,M2)∣M1 =m1 ∩M2 =m ] .
The condition states that the probability of obtaining the
ciphertext pair (c1, c2) is the same whether we encrypt(m1,m2) or (m1,m). That is, observation of the ciphertexts
c1, c2 does not yield information about the decryption of c2
even if we know the decryption of c1.
E. Perfect blindness against the decryptor
We still need to consider privacy against a malicious De-
cryptor. It is reasonable to assume that c1, c2, . . . , cL have been
delivered to Alice using a private channel. If the Decryptor can
observe cj for j ∈ {1,2, . . . , L}, it means that he knows the
corresponding plaintext messages since he is in possession of
the blind decryption key. Therefore, it is natural to require
that the ciphertexts are protected by a separate secure channel
between Alice and the Encryptor. For the blindness property
we want the server to learn nothing of the actual message m
that Alice derives at the end of the blind decryption scheme.
In this case, the Decryptor knows the correct key k as well as
the messages c′ and m′ exchanged with Alice.
Definition 4.3 (Perfect ciphertext blindness against the
decryptor): A symmetric blind decryption scheme satisfies
perfect ciphertext blindness against the decryptor if for every
random variable M on the plaintext space and every m,m′ ∈M and every c′ ∈ C′
Pr [M =m ∣C ′ = c′ ∩M ′ =m′ ] = Pr [M =m] .
The condition states that it is equally easy to guess the correct
plaintext message with and without the information possessed
by the decryptor. Note that we have assumed that c1, c1, . . . , cL
have been delivered to Alice in perfect secrecy.
F. Perfect secrecy for symmetric blind decryption
Finally, we can state our definition of perfect secrecy based
on the properties defined above.
Definition 4.4 (Perfect secrecy of blind decryption): A sym-
metric blind decryption scheme consisting of a symmetric en-
cryption scheme SE and a blind decryption protocol BlindDec
satisfies perfect secrecy for symmetric blind decryption for
6Alice Encryptor
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Figure 6. General overview of SymmetricBlind. Two tiers of encryption are
applied. The outer tier (SE) satisfies ordinary perfect secrecy. The inner tier
(2PAD) provides perfect leak-freeness against Alice and has a transformation
property enabling perfect blindness against the decryptor.
a single decryption of a maximum of L messages against
a single malicious party if the scheme is perfectly leak-free
against the encryptor for a maximum of L messages, SE
is leak-free against Alice and the scheme satisfies perfect
ciphertext blindness against the decryptor.
V. A CONCRETE BLIND DECRYPTION SCHEME
We shall now devise a blind decryption scheme
SymmetricBlind that satisfies Def. 4.4. We shall implement our
scheme using two tiers of symmetric encryption. For the outer
tier we apply a scheme that satisfies ordinary perfect secrecy.
Let that scheme be denoted by SE. The outer encryption
scheme will hide information about c1, c2, . . . , cL from the
Decryptor and also provide secrecy for c′ and m′ against
the Encryptor. To achieve perfect blindness and leak-freeness
against Alice, we design an inner tier encryption scheme called
2PAD that satisfies a useful transformation property. The
property enables us to construct a blind decryption protocol
BlindDec. To sum it up, our final construction will consist of
two tiers of encryption and a protocol for Alice to query a
single decryption from the Decryptor. The general overview
of the scheme is depicted in Figure 6.
It would be possible to implement some of the required
privacy properties with multiple applications of the one time
pad. For example, if ci =mi⊕ki, Alice could hide the plaintext
message from the Decryptor by querying for the decryption
of c′i = ci ⊕ k′, where k′ is only known to Alice. The correct
plaintext message would be obtained from m′i = c′i ⊕ ki =
ci ⊕ k′ ⊕ ki by computing m′i ⊕ k′ = ci ⊕ ki = mi. However,
such a protocol would leak i to the Decryptor since i would
be needed for decryption. In addition, for a single decryption,
the Decryptor would have to maintain a set of L keys which
would quickly grow to an unmanageable size as L grows. In
contrast, the optimal key size for single decryption would be
2∣mi∣, where ∣mi∣ is the bit length of mi, assuming that each
plaintext message is of the same bit length. Therefore, simply
applying the one time pad is not sufficient.
In the following, we first describe our inner encryption
scheme 2PAD that will provide perfect leak-freeness against
Alice, as well as the required message transformation property.
Then, we proceed to the description of a blind decryption
protocol utilizing this scheme. Finally, we combine the inner
encryption scheme with an outer encryption scheme that
satisfies ordinary perfect secrecy and describe the complete
blind decryption scheme.
A. The inner encryption scheme
We shall first construct an inner encryption scheme called
2PAD with some useful properties. Our inner scheme is based
on modular arithmetic on the ring Zp2 , where p ≥ 5 is a prime.
Our plaintext space is Zp and every m ∈ Zp is mapped to Zp2
which is the ciphertext space. To satisfy Def. 4.2, we want to
add an amount of randomness that is at least twice the binary
length of m in the encryption operation. Therefore, the keys
of 2PAD will consist of a pair (xk, yk) ∈ Zp ×Zp.
Let z ∈ Zp2 . Then,
z ≡ pz′ + z′′ (mod p2)
where z′, z′′ ∈ Zp. Therefore, we can essentially represent z
with two elements of Zp. Using such a representation, we
encrypt a single message m ∈ Zp by first sampling a random
element z ← U(Zp ∖ {0}) and setting b ∶= (pm + z)mod p2.
Then, we add the key (xk, yk) by computing
c ∶= (pxkb2 + pykb + b)mod p2 = pxkz2 + pykz + pm + z
which is the ciphertext message. Such an encryption operation
entails a useful transformation property. For every xk, yk ∈ Zp
and b, b′ ∈ Zp2 such that b ≡ b′ (mod p),
pxkb
′2 + pykb′ + b′ ≡ pxkb2 + pykb + b′ (mod p2).
Namely, if we know a plaintext m1 and its encryption c1 =
pxkz
2 + pykz + pm1 + z, we know the decryption m2 of c2
for every c2 ≡ c1 (mod p) since it can be computed by the
following algorithm.
1: procedure Map(c1,m1, c2)
2: If c1 /≡ c2 (mod p) output ⊥
3: m2 ∶= (c2 − c1 + pm1)/p
4: output m2
5: end procedure
Let z ≡ c1 ≡ c2 (mod p). The algorithm works because(c2 − c1 + pm1)/p = (pxkz2 + pykz + pm2 + z− pxkz2 − pykz − pm1 − z + pm1)/p= (pm2)/p=m2.
The Map algorithm can transform the decryption m1 of a
ciphertext c1 to the decryption m2 of c2 whenever c2 ≡ c1(mod p).
7Decryption is straightforward knowing the key (xk, yy).
Its operation, as well as the complete encryption scheme is
described below.
Definition 5.1 (2PAD): The symmetric encryption scheme
2PAD = (Gen2PAD,Enc2PAD,Dec2PAD)
consists of the following three algorithms.
1: procedure Gen2PAD(s) ▷ s determines the size for the
plaintext space
2: Choose a public prime p such that p ≥ 5 and p ≥ 2s
3: xk ← U(Zp)
4: yk ← U(Zp)
5: output (xk, yk)
6: end procedure
1: procedure Enc2PAD(xk, yk,m) ▷ Input consists of a key(xk, yk) and a message m ∈ Zp
2: z ← U(Zp ∖ {0})
3: b ∶= (pm + z)mod p2
4: c ∶= (pxkb2 + pykb + b)mod p2
5: output c
6: end procedure
1: procedure Dec2PAD(xk, yk, c) ▷ Input consists of a key(xk, yk) and a ciphertext c ∈ Zp2
2: z ∶= cmod p
3: t ∶= (p(−xk)z2 + p(−yk)z + c)mod p2
4: m ∶= (t − z)/p
5: output m
6: end procedure
The plaintext and ciphertext spaces of 2PAD depend on the
chosen prime p. In particular, the plaintext space is Zp while
the ciphertext space is Zp2 . Let us show the correctness of the
scheme. That is,
Dec2PAD(xk, yk,Enc2PAD(xk, yk,m)) =m
for every key (xk, yk) and plaintext m. Let c =
Enc2PAD(xk, yk,m). Then we have
c = pxkb2 + pykb + b≡ pxkz2 + pykz + pm + z (mod p2)
and cmod p = z, where z ∈ Zp. Now,
Dec2PAD(xk, yk, c) = (t − z)/p= (p(−xk)z2 + p(−yk)z+ pxkz2 + pykz + pm + z − z)/p= (pm + z − z)/p =m.
We shall later show that given a single plaintext, ciphertext
pair (m1, c1) and a ciphertext c2 such that c2 /≡ c1 (mod p)
we still have information theoretic security for c2. That is,
2PAD satisfies perfect leak-freeness against Alice whenever
ci /≡ cj (mod p) for i ≠ j. However, suppose that we have two
plaintext, ciphertext pairs (m1, c1), (m2, c2) such that c1 /≡ c2(mod p). We can show that the key xk, yk can be completely
determined from such two pairs.
Proposition 5.1: For every plaintext, ciphertext pair(m1, c1), (m2, c2) such that c1 /≡ c2 (mod p) there is a unique
key (xk, yk) such that
c1 = Enc2PAD(xk, yk,m1),
c2 = Enc2PAD(xk, yk,m2).
Proof: Let z1, z2 ∈ Zp such that z1 ≡ c1 (mod p) and
z2 ≡ c2 (mod p). Let also v1 = (c1 − pm1 − z1)/p and v2 =(c2 − pm2 − z2)/p. Then, we have a system of two equations
v1 = xkz21 + ykz1,
v2 = xkz22 + ykz2,
where v1, v2, z1, z2 are known. Let now
Z = (z21 z22
z1 z2
) .
Note that since z1, z2 /≡ 0 (mod p) and z1 /≡ z2 (mod p) we
have z21z2 − z1z22 /≡ 0 (mod p) and Z is invertible modulo p.
Therefore, the equation pair has a unique solution(v1 v2) ⋅Z−1 = (xkz21 + ykz1 xkz22 + ykz2) ⋅Z−1= (xk yk)(z21 z22z1 z2) ⋅Z−1= (xk yk) .
Due to Map, we require that if Bob sends L ciphertext
messages c1, c2, . . . , cL to Alice we have ci /≡ cj (mod p) for
every i ≠ j. Therefore, the maximum number of ciphertext
messages under the same key is determined by L ≤ p − 1.
B. Blind decryption protocol
Next, we give a description of a blind decryption protocol
based on the transformation algorithm Map.
Definition 5.2 (BlindDec): Suppose that the Encryptor and
the Decryptor share a key (xk, yk) = Gen2PAD(s) intended
for a single decryption by Alice. Furthermore, let Alice have
an encrypted message c = Enc2PAD(xk, yk,m) that is not
known to the Decryptor. Finally, suppose that the prime p
is public knowledge. Let the protocol BlindDec be defined by
the following exchange between Alice and the Decryptor:
1) Alice: Compute c′ ∶= cmod p and transmit it to the
Decryptor.
2) Decryptor: Reply with m′ = Dec2PAD(xk, yk, c′).
3) Alice: Compute the plaintext message m =
Map(c′,m′, c).
Let us quickly check the correctness of BlindDec. Let z ≡ c′ ≡
c (mod p). Then, c = pxkz2 + pykz + pm+ z, where m is the
plaintext message. The Decryptor replies with
m′ = (p(−xk)z2 + p(−yk)z + z − z)/p = (−xk)z2 + (−yk)z.
But now Alice can compute
Map(c′,m′, c) = (c − z + pm′)/p= (pxkz2 + pykz + pm + z − z + pm′)/p= (pxkz2 + pykz + pm − pxkz2 − pykz)/p= (pm)/p=m
8which is the correct plaintext message.
C. The complete blind decryption scheme
As was mentioned earlier, the communication between
Alice and the Encryptor has to be protected in order to
prevent the Decryptor from obtaining the plaintext messages
corresponding to c1, c2, . . . , cL. If the Decryptor can observe
these ciphertext messages, it can freely decrypt all them since
it knows the correct key. Therefore, we need to apply an
outer encryption scheme that hides the ciphertext messages.
The same solution is the easiest way to provide perfect leak-
freeness against the Encryptor since it enables us to simplify
the secrecy conditions. In our case, we want to protect both
of these exchanges with an outer tier of encryption that
provides perfect secrecy. Let SEn = (Genn,Encn,Decn) be
any symmetric encryption scheme such that the plaintext and
ciphertext space is Zn. Let it also satisfy (ordinary) perfect
secrecy. We apply 2PAD together with SEn to provide the
required leak-freeness and blindess properties.
The outer tier is composed in the following way. Alice
and the Encryptor shares a set of keys k1, k2, . . . , kL. The
Encryptor protects each ciphertext message by computing uj =
Encp2(kj , cj) for j ∈ {1,2, . . . , L}. It sends u1, u2, . . . , uL
to Alice. Similarly, Alice and the Decryptor share a pair
of keys kC , kP that are used to protect c′i and m′i. Alice
sends w = Encp(kC , z) to the Decryptor who responds with
w′ = Encp(kP ,m′). The resulting scheme SymmetricBlind is
defined as follows.
Definition 5.3 (SymmetricBlind): Let SEn =(Genn,Encn,Decn) be a symmetric encryption scheme
such that the plaintext and ciphertext space is Zn and let SEn
satisfy perfect secrecy. Let Alice and the Encryptor share
a set of keys k1, k2, . . . , kL. Let Alice and the Decryptor
share a pair of keys kC , kP intended for a single blind
decryption by Alice. Let also the Encryptor and the Decryptor
share a blind decryption key (xk, yk) = Gen2PAD(s), where
2s ≥ L + 1, that is intended for single blind decryption
by Alice. SymmetricBlind is determined by the following
protocol.
Alice Encryptor
Choose m1,m2, . . . ,mL∀j ∶
cj = Enc2PAD(xk, yk,mj)
such that
cj /≡ cj′ (mod p) ∀j ≠ j′∀j ∶ uj = Encp2(kj , cj)
u1, u2, . . . , uL ←Ð u1, u2, . . . , uL∀j cj = Decp2(kj , uj)
Pick i
c′ = ci mod p
w = Encp(kC , c′) Decryptor
w Ð→ w
c′ = Decp(kC ,w)
m′ = Dec2PAD(xk, yk, c′)
w′ = Encp(kP ,m′)
w′ ←Ð w′
m′ = Decp(kP ,w′)
mi =Map(c′,m′, ci)
VI. SECURITY OF SYMMETRICBLIND
We shall now consider the security of SymmetricBlind. We
proceed to show that the devised scheme satisfies the three
conditions formulated in Section IV: perfect leak-freeness
against the encryptor and Alice and perfect blindness against
the decryptor.
A. Perfect leak-freeness against the encryptor
Proposition 6.1: SymmetricBlind satisfies perfect leak-
freeness against the encryptor for a single decryption of a
maximum of L ≤ p − 1 messages, where p is determined by
Gen2PAD(s).
Proof: The claim follows directly from the observation
that the Encryptor sees only w and w′. By the description
of SymmetricBlind, c′ and m′ are protected by encryption
satisfying perfect secrecy and thus do not leak information to
the Encryptor.
It is easy to see that the outer tier of encryption is necessary.
Suppose that the outer encryption scheme was not applied.
Then c′ would leak ci mod p which would betray i to the
Encryptor.
B. Perfect blindness against decryptor
We shall now prove that the Decryptor does not get infor-
mation about the plaintext message.
Proposition 6.2: SymmetricBlind satisfies perfect blindness
againt the decryptor for a single blind decryption.
Proof: Since c1, c2, . . . , cL are protected with perfect
secrecy, we only need to show that
Pr [M =m ∣C ′ = c′ ∩M ′ =m′ ] = Pr [M =m] ,
where C ′ and M ′ are the random variables associated to the
messages c′ and m′, respectively. Let X,Y denote the ran-
dom variables corresponding to the key elements (xk, yk) ←
Gen(s), respectively. The reply m′ from the Decryptor is
completely determined by the key (xk, yk) and the element
c′ = ci mod p since m′ = (−xk)c′2 + (−yk)c′. Therefore,
Pr [M =m ∣C ′ = c′ ∩M ′ =m′ ]= Pr [M =m ∣X = xk ∩ Y = yk ∩C ′ = c′ ] .
Let us consider C ′. By the description of the scheme, we
have C ′ = Ci mod p, where i is the chosen index of Alice.
But for every i we have, by the description of Enc2PAD, that
Ci mod p ∼ U(Zp ∖ {0}). Therefore, C ′ is independent with
X and Y and
Pr [M =m ∣X = xk ∩ Y = yk ∩C ′ = z ]= Pr [M =m ∣X = xk ∩ Y = yk ∩C ′ = z′ ]
for every z, z′ ∈ Zp ∖ {0} and
Pr [M =m ∣X = xk ∩ Y = yk ]= ∑
z∈Zp∖{0}Pr [M =m ∣X = xk ∩ Y = yk ∩C ′ = z ]⋅Pr [C ′ = z ∣X = xk ∩ Y = yk ]= 1
p − 1 ⋅ ∑z∈Zp∖{0}Pr [M =m ∣X = xk ∩ Y = yk ∩C ′ = z ]= Pr [M =m ∣X = xk ∩ Y = yk ∩C ′ = z ]
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By our assumption, M is independent with X and Y and
therefore we have
Pr [M =m ∣X = xk ∩ Y = yk ] = Pr [M =m]
which shows our claim.
The proof shows that the Decryptor (with the knowledge of
the key (xk, yk) and c′ and m′) does not gain any information
about the plaintext message m assuming that cj for j ∈{1,2, . . . , L} have been delivered to Alice in perfect secrecy.
Considering the secrecy against the Decryptor, it would suffice
send c′ without the additional level of encryption. However, the
additional level is necessary to achieve leak-freeness against
the Encryptor.
C. Perfect leak-freeness against Alice
We shall now consider a malicious Alice and show that the
observation of a single plaintext, ciphertext pair (m1, c1) does
not yield information about the decryption of c2 for c2 /≡ c1(mod p).
Proposition 6.3: SymmetricBlind satisfies perfect leak-
freeness against Alice for a single decryption of a maximum
of L ≤ p − 1 ciphertexts.
Proof: By the description of SymmetricBlind, the cipher-
text messages c1, c2, . . . , cL are of different congruence class
modulo p. Let M1,M2 be random variables over the plaintext
space Zp. Let X,Y denote the random variables corresponding
to the key elements (xk, yk) = Gen2PAD(s). We have to show
that
Pr [c1 = Enc2PAD(X,Y,M1) ∩ c2 = Enc2PAD(X,Y,M2)∣M1 =m1 ∩M2 =m2 ∩ c1 /≡ c2 (mod p)]= Pr [c1 = Enc2PAD(X,Y,M1) ∩ c2 = Enc2PAD(X,Y,M2)∣M1 =m1 ∩M2 =m ∩ c1 /≡ c2 (mod p)]
for every m1,m2,m ∈ {0,1,2, . . . , p−1} and c1, c2 ∈ Zp2 such
that c1 /≡ c2 (mod p).
Given a valid assignment for m1, c1 and c2, it suffices to
show that
Pr [c1 = Enc2PAD(X,Y,M1) ∩ c2 = Enc2PAD(X,Y,M2)∣M1 =m ∩M2 =m2 ∩ c1 /≡ c2 (mod p)] = 1/p2
for every m ∈ Zp. By Proposition 5.1, for every plaintext,
ciphertext pair (m1, c1), (m,c2) such that c1 /≡ c2 (mod p)
there is a unique key (xk, yk). Therefore,
Pr [c1 = Enc2PAD(X,Y,M1) ∩ c2 = Enc2PAD(X,Y,M2)∣M1 =m1 ∩M2 =m ∩ c1 /≡ c2 (mod p)]= Pr [X = xk ∩ Y = yk] .
By the definition of Gen2PAD, X and Y are independent and
we have
Pr [X = xk ∩ Y = yk] = Pr [X = xk] ⋅Pr [Y = yk]= 1/p2.
We have now established the perfect secrecy of
SymmetricBlind according to Def. 4.4.
Table III
PARAMETER EXAMPLES FOR SYMMETRICBLIND
p Decryptor key length plaintext length ciphertext length
[bits] [bits] [bits]
5 12 3 5
7 12 3 6
11 16 4 7
23 20 5 10
101 28 7 14
1009 40 10 20
5003 52 13 25
20011 60 15 29
231 − 1 124 31 62
261 − 1 244 61 122
2127 − 1 508 127 254
D. The parameters
An optimal encryption scheme, with plaintext space M,
that satisfies perfect leak-freeness against Alice for a single
decryption needs 2 log2 ∣M∣ bits of randomness for a key.
2PAD achieves exactly this bound since the plaintext space
is Zp and a single key (xk, yk) contains 2 log2 p bits of
randomness. Assuming that messages and keys are represented
by binary strings, we need 2⌈log2 p⌉ bits of key to encrypt
messages of length ⌊log2 p⌋. For a single decryption with
SymmetricBlind, the Decryptor needs to store the key elements
xk, yk ∈ Zp, as well as the keys kC , kP . The keys kC , kP are
used to encrypt messages of Zp. Therefore, ⌈log2 p⌉ bits for
each of these keys suffices for perfect secrecy. In total, the
Decryptor needs to store key material of 4⌈log2 p⌉ bits for a
single decryption of a message of bit length ⌊log2 p⌋.
Since the ciphertext space is Zp2 , the ciphertext length in
bits is approximately twice the plaintext length. Depending on
the length of the plaintext messages and the needed maximum
number of encryptions L ≤ p − 1, we should therefore choose
the smallest possible p, since its bit size has no effect on the
security of the scheme. Table III lists some possible choices
for p and the resulting key, plaintext and ciphertext lengths
in bits. Note that for long plaintext messages the maximum
number of messages L is practically unlimited.
VII. FUTURE WORK
There are two main drawbacks of the construction presented
in this paper. First, we have not considered active adversaries.
Similar to the one time pad, we have only considered such
adversaries that observe the flow of messages. For practical
scenarios, we need to consider adversaries that actively induce
errors into the protocol flow. However, such considerations
are most naturally conducted in the computational infeasibility
model which has been used, for instance, in [5]. In the active
adversaries setting, it would also be natural to consider the
security of the devised scheme in the framework of computa-
tional indistinguishability such that the truly random keys are
exchanged with pseudorandom bit strings. In particular, the
computationally hard version of our scheme yields efficient
practical implementations.
The second drawback is that we have only considered the
case of a single malicious party. While it does not make
sense to consider a scenario where Alice is colluding with
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the Encryptor against the Decryptor, the scenario where the
Encryptor and the Decryptor are colluding is an important
one. For many scenarios Alice cannot be certain whether
the Encryptor and the Decryptor are in fact separate entities.
However, if they are a single entity, the scenario is identical
to oblivious transfer. We cannot achieve information-theoretic
security in such a case [18]. For example, it is easy to see that
our construction fails for colluding Encryptor and Decryptor.
If that is the case, we effectively remove the outer layer of
encryption which means that c′ = ci mod p leaks i to the
adversary. To provide security against colluding Encryptor and
Decryptor, we would need to detect such collusion or to turn
to computational assumptions. We leave the question as an
open problem for future research.
Another interesting question for future work is to consider
the case where we do not apply the outer layer of encryption
from the Encryptor to Alice. Thus far, we have defined perfect
blindness so that the Decryptor has absolutely no information
about the plaintext message. However, we could relax the
requirement so that – similar to leak-freeness against the
encryptor – the information is conditioned on the plaintexts
m1,m2, . . . ,mL. In other words, we could relax the require-
ment so that the Decryptor may observe the selection (and
the corresponding plaintext messages) given to Alice. Such a
relaxation is natural in the oblivious transfer case where the
Encryptor and the Decryptor are the same entity. We could
then define blindness as a property requiring only that the
selection i is hidden. It is again easy to see that our scheme
without the outer layer of encryption fails such a property. If
c1, c2, . . . , cL are not protected, then c′ = ci mod p leaks the
selection i. We leave this consideration also for future work.
VIII. CONCLUSION
In this paper, we give a definition of perfect secrecy for
symmetric blind decryption in the setting where one of the
parties may be malicious but adhering to the protocol of
the scheme. We neither consider active adversaries nor the
setting where two of the participants are colluding against
the third. We construct a symmetric blind decryption scheme
SymmetricBlind and show that it satisfies our definition of per-
fect secrecy. The scheme is based on two layers of encryption,
where the inner layer utilizes a novel encryption scheme 2PAD
given in this paper. 2PAD is based on modular arithmetic with
Zp2 as the ciphertext space, Zp as the plaintext space and
Zp×Zp as the key space, where p ≥ 5 is a prime. The security
of SymmetricBlind is shown information theoretically and
does not depend on the size of p. For a fixed blind decryption
key, SymmetricBlind supports a single blind decryption from
a selection of L ≤ p − 1 messages. For a single decryption of
a message of bit length ⌊log2 p⌋, the decryption server needs
to store key material of 4⌈log2 p⌉ bits.
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